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 A Discourse on the Sciences 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
he close of the twentieth century is but ten years ahead. We live in an astonishing time. If we 
look at our feet, we discover shadows from both the past and the future. Shadows of a past we 
sometimes believe are no longer part of us and sometimes feel we have never left behind. Shadows 
of a future we sometimes believe we are already in and sometimes feel we shall never enter. 
When we look back into the past in an attempt to analyze the present state of the sciences, the 
first image that comes to mind is that of scientific progress. For the past 30 years the development of 
science has been so dramatic that all the preceding centuries—from the sixteenth century that gave 
birth to us all as scientists, to the nineteenth—strike us as ancient history. But a mere blink of an eye 
will make us realize with wonder that all the great scientists that established and charted our 
theoretical fields lived and worked between the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the 
twentieth: Adam Smith, Ricardo, Lavoisier, Humboldt, Darwin, Marx, Durkheim, Max Weber, 
Pareto, Planck, Poincaré, Einstein. Indeed, we might even say that in scientific terms we are still 
living in the nineteenth century and that the twentieth has not yet begun, nor will it perhaps begin 
before it ends. And were we to look ahead into the future, we would likewise be presented with two 
contradictory images. On the one hand, the potential technological applications inherent in our 
accumulated knowledge lead us to believe that 
* Translation of Urn discurso sobre as ciencias, 2a edicão (Porto: Ed Afrontamento, 1988). The translation was made by Maria 
Irene Ramalho and revised by the Editor. Teresa Lello prepared the manuscript for publication. Many (hanks to all of them. 
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we are on the brink of a society of communication and interaction, 
free from the needs and insecurities that are still so much part of the 
lives of many of us. It is as if the twenty-first century is already 
beginning before it has begun. On the other hand, our concern with 
the limits of scientific rigor and our awareness of such increasing 
dangers as ecological disaster or nuclear war make us fear that the 
twenty-first century might end before it ever begins. 
If we think of the synergy theory of Herman Haken, we may say 
that ours is a most unstable visual system, the least fluctuation of our 
visual perception causing ruptures in the symmetries of what we see. 
Looking at one and the same figure, we see first a white Grecian urn 
upon a black background, then two black Grecian profiles facing each 
other upon a white background. Which one is the true image? Both 
and neither. Such is the ambiguity and complexity of our time, a time 
of transition—at one with so much before and after it, but at odds 
with itself. 
As in other transition periods, which we understand and traverse 
with difficulty, we must go back to simple things and ask simple 
questions. Einstein used to say that there are questions that only 
children can ask, but that, once asked, shed a new light on our 
perplexities. Today, I have brought along a child who over two centuries 
ago asked a few simple questions about the sciences and the scientists. 
He asked them at the beginning of a cycle of scientific production 
which many of us believe has now come to its close. The child's name 
is Jean-jacques Rousseau. In his famous Second Discourse (1750), 
Rousseau raised many questions as he replied to the question posed by 
the Academy of Dijon (1964: 52ff.), itself rather childlike: does the 
progress of the sciences and the arts contribute to the purity or to the 
corruption of manners? This is an elementary question, at once 
profound and easy to understand. In order to answer it—eloquently 
enough to win first prize and not a few enemies—Rousseau in turn 
asked the following equally elementary questions: Is there a relationship 
between science and virtue? Is there any serious reason to replace the 
common sense knowledge we have of nature and of life, and which we 
share with the other men and women of our society, with the scientific 
knowledge produced by a few and unavailable to the majority of the 
people? Does science contribute to bridging the widening gap in our 
society between what one is and what one seems to be, between 
knowing  
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how to say and knowing how to do, between theory and practice? To 
these simple questions Rousseau gives an equally simple reply: a 
resounding no. 
It was then the middle of the eighteenth century. Modern science, 
which had emerged in the sixteenth century out of the scientific 
revolutions of Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, was abandoning the 
esoteric speculations of its founders to become the ferment of an 
unprecedented social and technological transformation. It was an 
amazing period of transition, moreover, that perplexed the more alert 
minds and made them reflect on the very foundations of their society 
and on the impact wrought upon it by the transformations of the 
emerging scientific order. Today, 200 years later, all of us are the 
products of that new order, the protagonists and living witnesses of the 
changes it brought about. However, in the 1990's things are no longer 
what they were twenty years ago. For reasons I shall try to sort out, we 
are once again perplexed, we have once more lost our epistemological 
confidence. We are overwhelmed by a sense of irremediable loss, all 
the stranger for our uncertainty about what it is that we are losing. We 
may even wonder at times if this sense of loss is perhaps just a fear that 
obscures the latest gains made in our individual and collective lives. 
And then again, there is always the confusion about what exactly it is 
that we have gained. 
Hence the ambiguity and the complexity of our present time. 
Hence, also, the idea snared by many, that we live in a period of 
transition. Hence, finally, the urgent need to give answers to simple, 
elementary, intelligible questions. An elementary question is a 
question that reaches, with the clarity of expert techniques, the deepest 
magma of our individual and collective perplexity. Such were the 
questions asked by Rousseau; such must ours be. As a matter of fact, 
two hundred years later, our questions are still the same as Rousseau's: 
we are once again faced with the need to ask about the relationship 
between science and virtue. 
Indeed, we must once again ask about the value of so-called 
common sense knowledge, the knowledge that we, as individual or 
collective subjects, create and use to give meaning to our practices, but 
which science insists on considering irrelevant, illusory, and false. 
And, finally, we must ask about the contribution of all this 
accumulated scientific knowledge to enriching or impoverishing our 
lives. In other words, we must ask if science has contributed posi- 
12 Boaventura de Sousa Santas 
tively or negatively to our happiness. Our difference from Rousseau is 
that, though our questions are equally simple, our answers will be far 
less so. A cycle of the hegemony of a certain scientific order has come 
to an end. The epistemic conditions of our questions are inscribed in 
the converse of the concepts we use to give them answers. We have to 
try to remove blinkers, walking a tightrope between being lucid and 
being unintelligible in our assertions. At the same time, the social and 
psychological bases of our queries have become different and far more 
complex. It is one thing to ask whether an automobile can be useful to 
me and bring me happiness if the question is posed when no one 
among my neighbors has an automobile, and another when everyone 
except me has one, or when I alone have one that is more than twenty 
years old. 
Obviously, we have to be far more Rousseauian in our queries than 
in our responses. Let me begin by briefly characterizing the hegemonic 
scientific order. I shall then analyze the signs that this hegemony is in 
crisis, distinguishing between its theoretical and sociological 
conditions. Finally, I shall speculate on the profile of the new emergent 
scientific order, again distinguishing between the theoretical and the 
sociological conditions of its emergence. 
My analysis will be based on the following working hypotheses: 1) 
the distinction between natural and social sciences is beginning to 
seem meaningless; 2) the social sciences will be the catalyst of the 
necessary synthesis between them; 3) to achieve this synthesis the 
social sciences must reject all forms of empirical or logical positivism 
or of mechanistic idealism or materialism, thus bringing back to the 
center of knowledge what is conventionally called the humanities; 4) the 
synthesis I have in mind does not aim at a unified science or even at a 
general theory, but merely at a set of theoretical aqueducts into which 
can converge various currents which have hitherto been considered 
theoretically separate; 5) to the degree that such a synthesis is 
achieved, the hierarchical distinction between scientific and common 
sense knowledge will gradually disappear, and praxis will become 
engaging in the philosophy of praxis. 
THE DOMINANT PARADIGM 
The prevailing model of rationality of modern science came out of 
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the scientific revolution of the sixteenth century and was developed 
primarily in the domain of the natural sciences during the following 
centuries. Although there were a few preliminary attempts in the 
eighteenth century, the model would be adopted by the emerging 
social sciences only in the nineteenth century. From then on, we may 
speak of a single global model of scientific rationality, with some 
internal variation to be sure, but one which distinguished itself from 
and defended itself quite conspicuously and consistently against two 
non-scientific (and therefore irrational) forms of knowledge that were 
potentially disturbing: common sense, and the so-called humanities 
(the latter including, among other things, history, philology, law, 
literature, philosophy, and theology). 
The new scientific rationality, being a global model, was also a 
totalitarian model, inasmuch as it denied rationality to all forms of 
knowledge that did not abide by its own epistemological principles and 
its own methodological rules. This was the main feature of the new 
paradigm, the feature that best symbolized its break with the preceding 
scientific paradigms. It was gradually consolidated in Copernicus's 
heliocentric theory of the movement of the planets, Kepler's laws on 
the planetary orbits, Galileo's laws on the gravity of bodies, and 
Newton's great cosmic synthesis, and most of all in the philosophical 
consciousness conferred upon these findings by Bacon and especially 
by Descartes. This preoccupation with being the instruments of a 
fundamental break that allowed for only one form of true knowledge is 
evident in the protagonists' attitudes. They marvel at their own findings 
while simultaneously displaying a serene, haughty arrogance vis-a-vis 
their contemporaries. 
In his book on World Harmony, published in 1619, Kepler writes, 
regarding the natural harmonies he had discovered in the celestial 
motions: "Forgive me, but I am happy; if you are angry, I shall per-
severe. ... My book may have to wait a long time for its readers. But 
then, even God had to wait for 6000 years to have his work beheld" 
(Kepler, 1939: 280). On the other hand, in that marvelous spiritual 
autobiography, The Discourse on Method (to which I shall come back 
later), Descartes writes, concerning his new method: 
Now I always try to lean towards diffidence rather than pre-
sumptions in the judgments I make about myself; and when I 
cast a philosophical eye upon the various activities and 
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undertakings of mankind, there are almost none which I do not 
consider vain and useless. Nevertheless, I have already reaped 
such fruit from this method that I cannot but feel extremely 
satisfied with the progress I think I have already made in the 
search for truth, and I cannot but entertain such hopes for the 
future as to venture the opinion that if any purely human 
occupation has solid worth and importance, it is the one I have 
chosen. (Descartes, 1988: 21) 
To understand this epistemological confidence we have to de-
scribe, at least briefly, the main features of the new scientific paradigm. 
Realizing that what separates them from the still dominant 
Aristotelian and medieval knowledge was not so much better obser-
vation of the facts but rather a new outlook on the world and on life, 
the protagonists of the new paradigm engaged in a passionate struggle 
against all forms of dogmatism and authority. The case of Galileo is 
particularly exemplary, as is Descartes' assertion of intellectual 
independence: "I was ... unable to choose anyone whose opinions 
struck me as preferable to those of all others and I found myself as it 
were forced to become my own guide" (Descartes, 1988: 28). This 
new way of looking at the world and at life led to two basic 
distinctions: between scientific knowledge and common sense on the 
one hand, and between nature and human beings on the other. 
Unlike Aristotelian science, modern science systematically dis-
trusted the evidence of our immediate experience. Such evidence 
which is at the root of common sense knowledge was alleged to be 
illusory. As Einstein emphasized in his preface to the Dialogue Con-
cerning the Two Chief World Systems, Galileo boldly sought to argue that 
his hypothesis about the rotation of the earth both around the sun and 
on its axis were not refuted by our inability to observe the mechanical 
effects of those movements, that is to say, by the fact that the earth 
seems to be motionless (1970: xvii). On the other hand, in modern 
science the separation between nature and human beings is total. 
Nature is mere extension and movement. It is passive, eternal, and 
reversible. It is a mechanism whose elements can be disassembled and 
then put back together again in the form of laws. It possesses no 
quality or dignity which impedes us from unveiling its mysteries. 
Furthermore, such unveiling is not contem- 
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plative, but quite active, since it aims at knowing nature in order to 
dominate and control it. In Bacon's words, science will make of 
humanity "the master and the owner of nature" (Bacon, 1933).1 
On the basis of these assumptions, scientific knowledge advances by 
observing natural phenomena in a free, disinterested, and systematic 
way, and with as much rigor as possible. Bacon's Novum Organum 
contrasts the uncertainty of unassisted reason to the certainty of ordered 
experiments (Koyré, 1981: 30). Contrary to what Bacon thought, 
experiments do not obviate the need for previous theorizing, deductive 
thinking, or even speculation, but require them not to omit empirical 
observation as part of the final demonstration. Galileo refuted 
Aristotle's deductions only to the degree that he found them untenable. 
And it was Einstein who called our attention to the fact that Galileo's 
experimental methods were so inadequate that, only by means of daring 
speculation, could he fill in the gaps in his empirical data (we need only 
remember that time could not be measured in that era in units smaller 
than seconds) (Einstein, 1970: xix). As for Descartes, he proceeded un-
mistakably from ideas to things and not the other way around, and gave 
priority to metaphysics as the ultimate basis of science. 
The ideas that governed observation and experimentation were 
those simple, clear ideas from which it was thought possible to arrive at 
a more profound and accurate knowledge of nature—that is to say: 
mathematical ideas. Mathematics provided modern science not only with 
its preferred analytical tool, but also with a logic of investigation, as 
well as a model of representing the structure of matter itself. According 
to Galileo, the book of nature is inscribed in geometric characters;2 and 
Einstein did not think otherwise.3 
1
 According to Bacon, "the ways that lead man to power and to science are very close, 
indeed they are almost the same" (1960: 110). Bacon also says that, if the aim of science is 
to dominate nature, it is equally true that "[n]ature to be commanded must be obeyed" (1960: 
39; my italics). The latter assertion has, however, not always been stressed as it ought to 
have been in interpretations of Bacon's theories of science. 
2
 Among many other passages of the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 
see the following speech by Salviati: "Taking man's understanding intensively, in so far as this 
term denotes understanding some propositions perfectly, I say that die human intellect does 
understand some of them perfectly, and thus in this it has as much absolute certainty as 
Nature itself has. Of such are the mathematical sciences alone; that is, geometry and 
arithmetic, in which the Divine intellect indeed knows infinitely more propositions, since it 
knows all. But with regard to those few which the 
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There are two main consequences that derive from the centrality of 
mathematics in modern science. First, to know means to quantify. 
Scientific rigor is gauged by the rigor of measurements. The intrinsic 
qualities of the object, so to speak, do not count, and are replaced by 
the quantities into which they can be translated. Whatever is not 
quantifiable is scientifically irrelevant. Secondly, the scientific method 
is based on the reduction of complexity. The world is complex and the 
human mind cannot grasp it entirely. To know means to break down 
and to classify in order to establish systematic relations among these 
parts. Already in Descartes, one of the rules of the Method was 
precisely to "divide each of the difficulties... into as many parts as 
possible and as may be required in order to resolve them better" 
(Descartes, 1988: 29). The primordial distinction is between the "initial 
conditions" and the "laws of nature." The initial conditions are the 
realm of complexity and contingency, where it is necessary to select 
those conditions that are relevant for the facts being observed. The 
laws of nature are the realm of simplicity and regularity, where it is 
possible to observe and measure with accuracy. This distinction 
between initial conditions and the laws of nature was, of course, far 
from "natural." It was, indeed, totally arbitrary, as Eugene Wigner has 
noted (1970: 3). Nonetheless, it was the very basis of modern science. 
The theoretical nature of scientific knowledge derives from the 
epistemological presuppositions and from the methodological rules 
already mentioned. It is a causal knowledge which aims at formulating 
laws in the light of observed regularities and with a view to foreseeing 
the future behavior of phenomena. The discovery of the laws of nature, 
then, rests on the assumption, on the one hand, that the relevant initial 
conditions can be identified (for example, in the case of falling bodies, 
the initial position and its velocity), and on the other hand, that the 
outcome will be independent of the place 
human intellect does understand, I believe that its knowledge equals the Divine in objective 
certainty, for here it succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which there can be no 
greater sureness" (Galileo, 1970: 103). 
3
 Einstein's admiration for Galileo is well expressed in the "Preface" referred to above 
(Einstein, 1970). His (instinctively) radical way of "seeing" the mathematical nature of the 
structure of matter partly explains his long struggle over the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics (especially against the Copenhagen interpretation). On this point, see Hoffmann 
(1973: 173ff.). 
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and time of the initial conditions. In other words, the discovery of the 
laws of nature is based on the principle that absolute position and 
absolute time are never relevant initial conditions. This is, according to 
Wigner (1970: 226), the most important theorem of invariance in 
classical physics. 
The laws, insofar as they are categories of intelligibility, depend on a 
concept of causality, chosen (but not arbitrarily) among those of 
Aristotelian physics. Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causes: the 
material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause. 
The laws of modern science are a kind of formal cause that gives priority 
to how-it-works as against who-is-the-agent or what-is-the-purpose of things. 
Thus, scientific knowledge breaks with common sense knowledge. 
Indeed, whereas in common sense (and hence in the practical knowledge 
it produces) cause and intention coexist comfortably, scientific 
determination and the formal cause entails ignoring intention. It is this 
type of formal cause that makes possible the prediction of reality, hence 
interference with it, and which ultimately allows modern science to 
answer the question about the foundation of its claims to accuracy and 
truth by pointing to its successes in manipulating and transforming 
reality. 
Knowledge that is based on the formulation of laws has as its 
metatheoretical presupposition the idea of order and stability in the 
world, the idea that the past repeats itself in the future. In Newtonian 
mechanics, the world of matter is a machine whose operations can be 
precisely determined by means of physical and mathematical laws—an 
eternal and static world hovering in an empty space, a world which 
Cartesian rationalism makes knowable by dividing it into its constituent 
parts. This idea of a machine-like world was so strong that it became the 
great universal hypothesis of the modern era. It may be surprising, even 
paradoxical, that such a way of knowing could become one of the pillars 
of the idea of progress that has pervaded European thought since the 
eighteenth century and that was the intellectual sign of the rise of the 
bourgeoisie.4 The truth is, however, that order and stability in the world 
are the precondition for the technological transformation of reality. 
Mechanistic determinism provides a clear horizon for a form of 
4
 See, among many others, Pollard (1971: 39).18 
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knowledge that was meant to be utilitarian and functional, acknowl-
edged less for its capacity to understand reality at the deepest level than 
for its capacity to control and transform it. At the social level, this was 
also the cognitive horizon most consonant with the interests of the 
rising bourgeoisie, who considered the society they were beginning to 
control as the final stage in the evolution of mankind (Comte's positive 
state, Spencer's industrial society, Durkheim's organic solidarity). 
Hence, Newton's prestige and the simple laws to which he reduced all 
the complexities of the cosmic order readily turned modern science into 
the hegemonic model of rationality that then spilled over from the study 
of nature into the study of society. As it had been possible to discover 
the laws of nature, so would it be possible to discover the laws of 
society. 
Bacon, Vico, and Montesquieu were the great precursors. Bacon 
affirmed the plasticity of human nature, hence its perfectibility-given 
appropriate political, legal, and social conditions, which can be 
accurately known. Vico suggested that there are laws that govern the 
evolution of societies deterministically and that allow for the prediction 
of the outcome of collective actions. With remarkable premonition, 
Vico (1968) identified and solved the contradiction between the 
freedom and unpredictability of individual human action and the 
determinism and predictability of collective action. Montesquieu (1989) 
may be considered a precursor of the sociology of law, when he 
established a relationship between the man-made laws of the legal 
system and the inescapable laws of nature. 
In the eighteenth century these preliminary efforts were expanded 
and deepened into that intellectual ferment—the Enlightenment—
which would create the conditions for the emergence of the social 
sciences in the nineteenth century. The philosophic understanding of 
modern science, first formulated in Cartesian rationalism and Baconian 
empiricism, evolved into nineteenth-century positivism. Since, for 
positivism, there are only two forms of scientific knowledge—the 
formal disciplines of logic and mathematics and the empirical sciences 
following the mechanistic model of the natural sciences—the social 
sciences could not but be empirical. The way in which the mechanistic 
model was followed varied, however. It is common to distinguish two 
main tendencies. The dominant one consisted in applying to the study 
of society, to the degree possible, all the epistemological and 
methodological principles that 
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had dominated the study of nature since the sixteenth century. The 
other one, long a marginal tendency but with an increasing number of 
followers, consisted in claiming for the social sciences its own 
distinct epistemological and methodological status, based upon the 
specificity of the human being radically different from nature. These 
two conceptions have usually been taken to be antagonistic, the former 
being subject to the positivist yoke, the latter free from it, both 
claiming the monopoly of social-scientific knowledge. I shall offer a 
different interpretation, once I have briefly characterized them. 
The first conception—whose epistemological commitment is 
clearly symbolized in the name of "social physics" which the scientific 
study of society was initially called—takes for granted that the natural 
sciences are the concrete application of a model of knowledge that is 
universally valid, and indeed the only valid one. Therefore, no matter 
how large the differences between natural and social phenomena, it is 
always possible to study the latter as if they were the former. 
Admittedly, such differences work against social phenomena, or rather, 
they make the methodological canon harder to accomplish and the 
knowledge arrived at less accurate. But there are no qualitative 
differences between scientific procedure in the social sciences and in 
the natural sciences. In order to study social phenomena as if they were 
natural phenomena, that is, in order to conceive of social facts as 
things (as envisioned by Durkheim (1982), the founder of academic 
sociology), it is necessary to reduce social facts to their external, 
observable, measurable dimensions. The causes of the rise in the rate 
of suicide in Europe at the turn of the century are not to be looked for 
in the motives invoked by those committing suicide in their letters, as 
had been the custom, but rather by checking the regularities in such 
conditions as the sex and marital status of those committing suicide, 
whether or not they had children, their religion, and so on (Durkheim, 
1951). 
Because such reductionism is not always easy and not always 
possible without grossly distorting the facts or even reducing them to 
near irrelevance, the social sciences have a long way to go before they 
can be made compatible with the criteria of scientificity of the natural 
sciences. The obstacles are enormous but not insurmountable. The 
Structure of Science by Ernest Nagel is a good example of the efforts 
made in this field to identify the obstacles and the ways 
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of overcoming them. Some of the principal obstacles he identified are the 
following: There are no explanatory theories in the social sciences that 
would allow them to abstract from reality in such a way as to be able to 
search for adequate proof in that reality in a methodologically controlled 
way. The social sciences cannot establish universal laws because social 
phenomena are historically conditioned and culturally determined. The 
social sciences cannot make reliable predictions because human beings 
change their behavior according to how much is known about it. Social 
phenomena are naturally subjective and as such they cannot be 
understood as objective behavior. The social sciences are not objective 
because the social scientist cannot free his observations from the values 
that underlie his general practice, and hence also his practice as a sci-
entist (Nagel, 1961: 447ff). 
For each of these obstacles, Nagel tried to demonstrate that the 
opposition between the social and the natural sciences is not so linear as 
commonly thought and that, whatever differences there may be, they are 
either surmountable or negligible. He recognized, however, that 
overcoming obstacles is not always easy, and that this accounts for the 
backwardness of the social sciences vis-a-vis the natural sciences. The 
idea of the backwardness of the social sciences is central to this kind of 
methodological reasoning, as is the idea that, with time and money, this 
backwardness may be reduced or even eliminated. 
In Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions the backwardness of 
the social sciences was explained by their pre-paradigmatic nature, as 
opposed to the paradigmatic nature of the natural sciences. The 
development of knowledge in the natural sciences has allowed for the 
formulation of a set of principles and theories about the structure of 
matter which are unquestionably accepted by the entire scientific 
community. This acceptance is what we mean by a paradigm. But in the 
social sciences there is no paradigmatic consensus, which is why the 
debate tends to involve every kind of acquired knowledge. The strain and 
the waste this involves are both cause and effect of the backwardness of 
the social sciences. 
The second conception claims an independent methodological status 
for the social sciences. According to this view, the obstacles identified 
above are insurmountable. Some reject the very notion of a science of 
society; others argue that it is a different kind of sci- 
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ence. The main argument is that human action is radically subjective. 
Unlike natural phenomena, human behavior cannot be described, let 
alone explained, on the basis of its external, objectifiable characteristics, 
since the same external act may have multiple interpretations. The social 
sciences will always be a subjective science, not an objective science like 
the natural sciences. The social sciences must understand social 
phenomena in terms of the attitudes and the meanings that the agents 
ascribe to their actions. That requires research methods and 
epistemological criteria different from those used in the natural sciences, 
qualitative rather than quantitative methods, in order to arrive at 
intersubjective, descriptive, empathetic knowledge, as opposed to 
objective, explanatory, nomothetic knowledge. 
The latter conception of the social sciences acknowledges being anti-
positivist. Its philosophical tradition is phenomenology in its many 
varieties, from a more moderate version, as in Max Weber (1968), to a 
more radical one, as in Peter Winch (1970). However, close inspection 
reveals that this view, as it has been elaborated, is more dependent on 
the model of rationality of the natural sciences than it at first seems. It 
shares the nature/human beings dichotomy, which amounts to a 
mechanistic view of nature, to which it contrasts, as one might expect, the 
specificity of human beings. This distinction, which was crucial for the 
scientific revolution of the sixteenth century, led in turn to others, such 
as those between nature and culture and between humans and animals, 
culminating in the eighteenth century in the celebration of the unique 
character of humanity. The line thus delineated between the study of 
humanity and the study of nature remained a prisoner of the cognitive 
priority assigned to the natural sciences, since although, on the one hand, 
a biological determinism of human behavior was denied, on the other 
hand, biological arguments were used to establish the specificity of the 
human being. 
The inescapable conclusion then is that both these conceptions of 
science belong to the paradigm of modern science, even if the second 
conception points to a crisis in the paradigm and already contains some 
elements of transition towards a new scientific paradigm. 
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THE CRISIS IN THE DOMINANT PARADIGM 
There are many clear signs today that the model of scientific 
rationality I have outlined above is going through a profound crisis. In 
this section I shall argue, first, that the crisis is not only profound but also 
irreversible; secondly, that we are living in a time of scientific revolution 
that began with Einstein and quantum physics, and that it is not yet clear 
when it will end; thirdly, that, although the signs in question allow for 
nothing more than mere speculation about the paradigm that will emerge 
out of this revolutionary time, we may already assert with certainty that 
the basic distinctions underlying the dominant paradigm described above 
will collapse. 
The crisis of the dominant paradigm is the result of a series of 
interacting conditions. I make a distinction between social and theoretical 
conditions. I shall pay more attention to theoretical conditions and begin 
with them. My first remark, which is not as trivial as it sounds, is that the 
identification of the limits and structural shortcomings of the modern 
scientific paradigm is the outcome of the great advance in knowledge it 
made possible. The deepening of knowledge revealed the fragility of the 
pillars on which it rested. 
Einstein was responsible for the first rupture in the paradigm of 
modern science, indeed a wider rupture than he himself would ever have 
been able personally to admit. One of Einstein's profoundest insights was 
the relativity of simultaneity. Einstein distinguished between the 
simultaneity of events happening in the same place, and the simultaneity 
of distant events, particularly events separated by astronomical distances. 
As far as the latter are concerned, the logical problem is the following: 
how can the observer establish the temporal order of events in space? To 
be sure, by measuring the velocity of light, assuming, as Einstein's theory 
does, that in nature there is no velocity that is greater. However, upon 
measuring velocity going in one direction (from A to B), Einstein was 
confronted with a vicious circle. In order to determine the simultaneity of 
distant events the velocity must be known, and in order to measure 
velocity the simultaneity of events must be known. In a flash of genius, 
Einstein broke this circle, by demonstrating that the simultaneity of distant 
events cannot be verified, but merely defined. It is, therefore, arbitrary, 
and thus, as Reichenbach (1970: 60) pointed 
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out, when we measure, the results cannot be contradictory insofar as 
they give us back the simultaneity that we have introduced into the 
measuring system by definition. 
This theory has revolutionized our conceptions of time and space. 
Since there is no universal simultaneity, Newton's absolute time and 
space do not exist. Two events that are simultaneous in one system of 
reference are not simultaneous in another. The laws of physics and 
geometry are based on local measurements. "The instruments for 
measuring, be they clocks or yardsticks, have no independent 
magnitude; rather, they adjust themselves to the metric field of space, the 
structure of which manifests itself most clearly in the rays of light" 
(Reichenbach, 1970: 68). 
Considering the local character of measurements, and hence of the 
accuracy of the knowledge thus obtained, led to the second theoretical 
condition of the crisis of the dominant paradigm, namely quantum 
physics. If Einstein relativized the accuracy of Newton's law in the field of 
astrophysics, quantum physics did the same in the field of microphysics. 
Heisenberg and Bohr demonstrated that it is not possible to observe or 
measure an object without interfering with it, without actually changing 
it in such a way that, after being measured, the object is no longer the 
same as it was before. As Wigner pointed out, "the measurement of the 
curvature of space caused by a single particle could hardly be carried out 
without creating new fields which are many billion times greater than 
the field under investigation" (1970: 7). The idea that we know nothing 
about the real but what we ourselves bring to it, that is to say, that we 
know nothing of the real except our intervention in it, is well expressed in 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle—we cannot simultaneously reduce the 
errors of the measurement of velocity and of the position of particles; 
whatever we do to reduce the error of the one will increase the error of 
the other (Heisenberg, 1958; 1971). This principle, and therefore the 
demonstration of the subject's structural interference in the observed 
object, is of great consequence. On the one hand, since the rigor of our 
knowledge is structurally limited, we can aspire only to approximate 
results which makes the laws of physics merely probabilistic. On the 
other hand, the hypothesis of mechanistic determinism is no longer 
viable, since the whole of reality is not reducible to the sum of the parts 
into which we divide it in order to observe and measure it. 
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Finally, the subject/object distinction is far more complex than it may 
seem at first. It loses its dichotomous contours to assume the form of a 
continuum. 
The accuracy of measurement that quantum physics put into question 
would be even more deeply shaken if we question the accuracy of the 
formal vehicle used to express the measurements, mathematical rigor. 
This happened with the work of Gödel, which for that reason I consider 
the third condition of the crisis. The theorem of incompleteness or the 
theorems about the impossibility, in certain circumstances, of finding 
within a given formal system the proof of its consistency demonstrate 
that, even if the rules of mathematical logic are strictly followed, it is 
possible to formulate undecidable propositions, which can be neither 
demonstrated nor refuted, one of the propositions being precisely the one 
that postulates the non-contradictory character of the system.5 If the laws 
of nature base their rigor on the rigor of the mathematical formalizations 
in which they are expressed, then Godel's findings demonstrate that the 
rigor of mathematics is itself in need of a foundation. After this, it is 
possible not only to question the accuracy of mathematics but also to 
redefine it as one form of accuracy that contrasts with alternative forms 
of rigor. In other words, it is a form of rigor whose conditions of success 
in modern science can no longer be taken for granted as obvious and 
natural. The philosophy of mathematics itself has engaged in the creative 
problematization of these themes, and today it is recognized that 
mathematical accuracy, like any other form of rigor, is based on a 
criterion of selectivity, thus having both a constructive and a destructive 
side. 
The fourth theoretical condition of the crisis of the Newtonian 
paradigm derives from the advances of knowledge in the fields of 
microphysics, chemistry, and biology over the past twenty years. Let me cite, 
by way of example, the findings of Ilya Prigogine. His theory of 
dissipative structures and his principle of "order through fluctuations" 
established that, in open systems, that is, in systems that function far from 
equilibrium, evolution is explained by fluctuations of energy which, at 
certain not entirely predictable moments, 
5
 The impact of Gödel's theorems on philosophy of science has been assessed in different 
ways. See, e.g., Ladrière (1967: 312ff.), Jones (1982: 158), Parain-Vial (1983: 52ff.), Thorn 
(1985: 36), and Briggs & Peat (1985: 22). 
DISCOURSE ON THE SCIENCES                                                                                                                   25 
 
spontaneously generate reactions, which in turn, by means of nonlinear 
mechanisms, pressure the system beyond its utmost limit of disequilibrium. 
The situation of bifurcation, that is to say, the critical point at which the 
slightest fluctuation may lead to a new state, represents the potentiality of 
the system to be attracted to a new state of lesser entropy. Thus the 
irreversibility of open systems means that they are the product of their 
history (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Prigogine, 1980; 1981: 73ff.). 
The importance of this theory is that it rests on the new conception of 
matter and of nature, which is hard to reconcile with the one we inherited 
from classical physics. In place of eternity, we now have history; in place of 
determinism, unpredictability; in place of mechanicism, interpenetration, 
spontaneity, irreversibility, and evolution; in place of order, disorder; in 
place of necessity, creativity and contingency. Prigogine's theory revives 
even such Aristotelian concepts as potentiality and virtuality, which the 
sixteenth century scientific revolution appeared to have definitively cast 
into the dustbin of history. 
But the greatest importance of this theory is that it is not an isolated 
phenomenon. It is rather part of a converging movement, which has gained 
strength mainly since the 1970's, and which traverses the various natural 
sciences and even the social sciences. It has indeed a transdisciplinary 
calling that Jantsch (1980) calls the self-organization paradigm and which 
is developed, among others, by Prigogine's theory, Haken's synergetics 
(Haken, 1977; 1985: 205), Eigen's concept of the hypercycle and his theory 
on the origin of life (Eigen & Schuster, 1979), Maturana and Varela's 
concept of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1973; 1975),6 Thom's 
catastrophe theory (Thorn, 1985: 85ff.), Jantsch's evolutionary theory 
(Jantsch, 1981: 83ff.), David Bohm's theory of the "implicate order" 
(Bohm, 1984), and Geoffrey Chew's S-matrix theory and its underlying 
"bootstrap" philosophy (Chew, 1970: 762ff.; 1970: 23ff.).7 This scientific 
movement, along with the theoretical innovations that I have defined 
above as so many theoretical conditions of the crisis of the dominant 
paradigm, have precipitated a profound epistemo- 
6
 See Benseler, Heijl &: Koch (1980). 
 
7See Capra(1979: llff.). 
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logical reflection on scientific knowledge. This is such a rich and 
varied reflection that, better than anything else, it exemplifies the 
intellectual situation of our time. 
There are two important sociological facets to this reflection. 
Firstly, it is predominantly carried out by the scientists themselves, 
those that have mustered the necessary philosophical competence and 
concern to problematize their own scientific practice. We can safely 
state that there have never been so many philosopher-scientists as 
today, a trend that is not intellectually accidental. After the nineteenth-
century scientistic euphoria and the concomitant aversion to 
philosophical reflection, epitomized by positivism, we have at the end 
of the twentieth century been seized by the near desperate desire to 
complement our knowledge of things with our knowledge of our 
knowledge of things—in other words, with a knowledge of ourselves. 
The second facet of this reflection is that it deals with questions 
previously left to sociologists. The analysis of the social conditions, of 
the cultural contexts, of the organizational models of scientific research, 
which previously had been the separate realm of the sociology of 
science, have now come to play a key role in epistemological reflection. 
Let me now give a few examples of the main themes of this 
reflection. First, the concept of laws and the related concept of 
causality are put into question. The formulation of the laws of nature is 
based on the idea that the observed phenomena are independent of all 
but a fairly small number of conditions—the initial conditions—whose 
interference is observed and measured. This idea, it is now recognized, 
necessarily creates broad distinctions between phenomena, distinctions 
which furthermore are always provisional and precarious, since the 
verification of the non-interference of certain factors is always the 
result of imperfect knowledge, however more nearly correct they may 
become. The laws are thus probabilistic, approximate, and provisional, 
as clearly laid out in Popper's falsifiability principle. But above all, the 
simplicity of laws constitutes an arbitrary simplification of reality that 
confines us to a minimal horizon beyond which lie other kinds of 
knowledge about nature, probably richer and of far greater human 
interest. 
In biology, where interactions among phenomena and forms of 
self-organization in non-mechanical totalities are more visible, but 
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also in the other sciences, the notion of law has been partially replaced 
by the notions of system, structure, pattern, and finally by the notion of 
process. The decline of the hegemony of laws is parallel to the decline 
of the hegemony of causality. The questioning of causality in modern 
times has a long tradition, going back at least to David Hume and 
logical positivism. Critical reflection has addressed both the ontological 
problem of causality (what are the characteristics of the causal nexus? 
does such a nexus exist in reality?) and the methodological problem of 
causality (what are the criteria of causality? how can a causal nexus be 
identified or a causal hypothesis tested?). Today, the relativization of 
the concept of cause stems mainly from the acknowledgment that the 
central place it has occupied in modern science has its explanation less 
in ontological or methodological than in pragmatic reasons. The concept 
of causality is well suited to a science that aims at intervening in reality 
and that measures its success by the scope of its intervention. After all, a 
cause is something that can be acted upon. Even advocates of causality, 
such as Mario Bunge (1979), recognize that it is merely one of the forms 
of determinism and that it therefore plays a limited, though 
irreplaceable, role in scientific knowledge.8 The truth is that, under the 
aegis of biology and even of microphysics, "causalism" as a category for 
the intelligibility of the real is now giving way to "finalism." 
The second great theme of epistemological reflection deals with the 
content rather than with the form of scientific knowledge. Since it is a 
minimal knowledge that closes the door to many other ways of 
knowing the world, modern scientific knowledge is a sad and 
disenchanted knowledge that turns nature into an automaton or, as 
Prigogine says, into an awfully stupid interlocutor (Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984). This vilification of nature ends up vilifying the 
scientist himself inasmuch as it reduces the alleged experimental 
dialogue to an act of prepotency over nature. Scientific rigor, be- 
8
 Bunge writes: "The causal principle is, in short, neither a panacea nor a myth; it is a 
general hypothesis subsumed under the universal principle of determinacy, and has an 
approximate validity in its proper domain" (Bunge, 1979: 353). In Portugal, it is only fair to 
stress Armando de Castro's remarkable theoretical work in this field (Castro, 1975; 1978; 
1980; 1982; 1987). 
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cause it is based on mathematical rigor, quantifies, and because it 
quantifies, it disqualifies. It is a rigor that, by objectifying phenomena, 
objectivizes and degrades them; in characterizing the phenomena, it 
caricatures them. In sum, scientific rigor is a form of rigor which, in 
asserting the scientist's personality, destroys the personality of nature. In 
this way, knowledge gains in rigor what it loses in richness. The 
vaunted successes of technology obscure the limits of our 
understanding of the world and suppress the question of the human 
value of a scientific endeavor thus conceived. This question is, 
however, inscribed in the subject/object relation presiding over 
modern science, a relationship that internalizes the subject at the cost 
of externalizing the object, thus making both of them self-enclosed and 
unable to communicate with each other. 
The limits of this kind of knowledge are thus qualitative and cannot 
be overcome by more research and more precise instruments. Indeed, 
the qualitative precision of knowledge is itself structurally limited. For 
example, as far as information theories are concerned, Brillouin's 
theorem demonstrates that information is not without cost (Brillouin, 
1956; Parain-Vial, 1983: 122ff.). Any observation performed on a 
physical system increases the system's entropy in the laboratory. The 
gain of a given experiment has therefore to be defined by the relation 
between the information obtained and the concomitant increase of 
entropy. But, according to Brillouin, the gain is always less than one 
and only rarely even close to one. In this view, a rigorous experiment 
is impossible, for it would require an infinite expenditure of human 
activity. Finally, precision is limited because, if it is true that 
knowledge advances only by the progressive subdivision of the object 
(as is attested by increasing scientific specialization), this also proves 
the irreducibility of wholes, whether organic or inorganic, to their 
constituent parts. Thus, the knowledge gained from observing the 
parts is necessarily distorted. The observed facts are beginning to break 
out of the solitary confinement to which science has subjected them. 
The frontiers of objects are less and less clear. The objects themselves 
are like rings interlocked in such complex chains that they end up 
being less real than the relations between them. 
At the beginning of this section, I said that the crisis of the paradigm 
of modern science is explained not only by theoretical conditions, which 
I have just partially indicated, but also by social condi- 
tions. The latter cannot be dealt with in detail here.9 I shall merely 
suggest that, no matter what the structural limits of scientific rigor, there 
can be no doubt that what science has gained in rigor over the past 40 or 
50 years, it has lost in capacity for self-regulation. The beliefs about the 
autonomy of science and about the disinterestedness of scientific 
knowledge, which has long constituted the spontaneous ideology of the 
scientists, have collapsed due to the global industrialization of science, 
especially since the 1930's and 1940's. Both in the capitalist societies 
and in the state socialist societies of eastern Europe, the industrialization 
of science has made it tainted by the centers of economic, social, and 
political power, which came to play a decisive role in the definition of 
scientific priorities. 
The industrialization of science occurred both at the level of applied 
science and at the level of the organization of scientific research. The 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were a tragic symbol of applied science. 
Initially viewed as accidental and fortuitous, they are today, in the face of 
the ecological disaster and the danger of a nuclear holocaust, 
increasingly perceived as the manifestation of a mode of scientific 
production prone to transform accidents into regular events. "Science 
and technology are showing themselves to be two sides of a historical 
process in which military and economic interests tend to converge to the 
point of becoming virtually indistinguishable" (Santos, 1978: 26). As far 
as the organization of scientific research is concerned, the 
industrialization of science has brought about two main results. On the 
one hand, the scientific community has become stratified, the power 
relations among scientists have become more unequal and authoritarian, 
and the great majority of scientists have undergone a process of 
proletarianization within laboratories and research centers. On the other 
hand, capital-intensive research (dependent on scarce and expensive 
instruments) made free access to equipment impossible, thus widening the 
gap, in terms of scientific and technological development, between core 
and peripheral countries. 
Under the social and theoretical conditions just mentioned, the 
crisis of the paradigm of modern science does not constitute some 
On this point, see Santos (1978: llff.). 
  
gloomy quagmire of skepticism or irrationalism. Rather, we find 
ourselves observing the portrait of an intellectual family that is large 
and unstable, but also creative and fascinating, at the moment of its 
rather sad farewell to conceptual points of reference, both theoretical 
and epistemological, ancestral and intimate, that are no longer 
persuasive and reassuring, a farewell in search of a better life in the 
surroundings where optimism is better founded and rationality more 
plural and where at last knowledge will once again become an 
enchanted adventure. The characterization of the crisis of the dominant 
paradigm brings with it the profile of the emergent paradigm. It is that 
profile I shall now attempt to draw. 
THE EMERGENT PARADIGM 
We can only speculate about the precise configuration of the 
dawning paradigm. Such speculation is, of course, based on the signals 
emitted by the crisis of the present paradigm, though they do not 
determine the outcome. Indeed, as Rene Poirier has said, and was noted 
by Hegel and Heidegger before him, "we can know the global 
coherence of our physical and metaphysical truth only retrospectively" 
(Poirier, 1983: 10). So, when we speak of the future that we feel we are 
already living, what we say about it is always the product of a personal 
synthesis steeped in imagination, in my own case, in the sociological 
imagination. No wonder then that, though they sometimes converge, the 
syntheses presented up to now are so different. Ilya Prigogine (1979; 
1980; 1981), for example, speaks of the new alliance and the 
metamorphosis of science. Fritjof Capra (1983; 1984) speaks of the 
new physics and the Tao of physics; Eugene Wigner (1970: 215ff.), of 
shifts of the second type; Erich Jantsch (1980; 1981), of the self-
organization paradigm; Daniel Bell (1976), of the post-industrial society; 
Habermas (1984), of the communicative society. 
As for myself, I shall speak of the paradigm of prudent knowledge 
for a decent life. By this phrasing I wish to signify that the scientific 
revolution we are undergoing today is structurally different from the 
sixteenth-century revolution. Because it is a scientific revolution 
occurring in a society that has already undergone a scientific 
revolution, its emergent paradigm cannot be merely a scientific 
paradigm (the paradigm of prudent knowledge), but must 
also be a social paradigm (the paradigm of a decent life). I shall present 
the emergent paradigm as a set of theses along with the justification of 
each. 
1. All natural-scientific knowledge is social-scientific. 
The dichotomy of natural and social sciences no longer has any 
meaning or utility. This distinction is based on a mechanistic con-
ception of matter and of nature with which it contrasts, it is presumed 
obviously, the concepts of human beings, culture, and society. The 
newest findings of physics and biology question the distinction between 
the organic and the inorganic, between living beings and inert matter, 
and even between the human and the non-human. The characteristics of 
self-organization, of metabolism, and of self-reproduction, which were 
previously thought to be specific to living beings, are nowadays 
ascribed as well to pre-cellular systems of molecules. Furthermore, they 
are ascribed traits and behavior that were previously believed to be 
specific to human beings and to social relations. All the recent 
scientific theories I have mentioned ascribe to matter the concepts of 
historicity and progress, freedom and self-determination—and even 
consciousness, which men and women had previously held to be 
inalienably their own. I am alluding to Prigogine's dissipative 
structures, Haken's synergy, David Bohm's "implicate order," Geoffrey 
Chew's matrix-S and its underlying "bootstrap" theory, as well as 
Fritjof Capra's synthesis of contemporary physics and Eastern 
mysticism. 
All these theories have a holistic vocation, and some are even 
intended to resolve the inconsistencies between quantum physics and 
Einstein's relativity. It is as if men and women had set out in search of 
the most distant and alien objects, and then, once they had gotten 
there, had discovered themselves as though they were being reflected 
in a mirror. At the beginning of the 1960's, extrapolating from quantum 
mechanics, Eugene Wigner maintained that the "inanimate" is not a 
different quality but only an extreme case (caso limite), that the 
distinction between body and soul has long ceased to have meaning, 
and that physics and psychology would eventually merge into one and 
the same science (Wigner, 1970: 271). Today it is possible to go far 
beyond quantum mechanics. If quantum mechanics made consciousness 
part of the act of knowing, we now have to make it part of the object of 
knowledge itself, and 
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thereby the distinction between subject and object will undergo a 
radical change. 
Not unlike Leibniz's pan-psychism, Bateson's "wider consciousness" 
refers to a psychic dimension of nature, of which the human mind is 
but a part, a mind immanent to the global social system and to the 
planetary ecology that some call God (Bateson, 1985). Geoffrey 
Chew postulates the existence of consciousness in nature as a 
necessary element for nature's self-consciousness, which would mean 
that future theories of matter will have to include the study of human 
consciousness. At the same time, we witness a renewed interest in 
Jung's "collective unconscious." Indeed, Capra claims that jung's 
ideas—primarily the idea of synchronicity to explain the relationship 
between inner and outer reality—are confirmed in particle physics by 
the recent concepts of local and non-local interactions.10 As in Jungian 
synchrony, non-local interactions are instantaneous and cannot be 
predicted in accurate mathematical terms. They are, therefore, not 
the outcome of local causes; we might, at the very most, speak of 
statistical causality. Capra considers Jung one of the theoretical 
alternatives to Freud's mechanistic conception, and Bateson asserts 
that, just as Freud expanded the concept of mind inwardly (allowing 
us to grasp the subconscious and the unconscious), we now need to 
expand it outwardly (by recognizing the existence of mental 
phenomena other than those of individuals and humans). 
Similarly, David Bohm's theory of the implicate order, which 
according to its author may constitute a common base for quantum 
theory and relativity, considers consciousness and matter as interde-
pendent, though not linked by any causal nexus. They are rather two 
related projections of a higher reality that is neither matter nor 
consciousness. According to the emergent paradigm, then, knowledge 
tends to be non-dualistic. It is a knowledge based on the superseding 
of familiar and obvious distinctions that were taken for granted until 
very recently—nature/culture, natural/artificial, animate/inanimate, 
mind/matter, observer/observed, subjective/objective, and 
animal/person. This relative collapsing of dichotomous distinctions has 
its repercussions on the scientific disciplines that derive from them. 
As a matter of fact, there have been sciences that 
10SeeBowen(1985:213ff.). 
never felt very comfortable with these distinctions, so much so that they 
had to fracture internally in order to conform to them minimally. I refer 
to anthropology, geography, and psychology. More than any others they 
have reflected the contradictions Drought about by the separation 
between natural and social science. That is why, in this period of 
paradigmatic transition, it is so important, from an epistemological point 
of view, to observe what is going on within these sciences. 
However, it is not enough to stress the tendency to supersede the 
distinction between the natural and the social sciences; we must 
understand the meaning and content of this supersession. Once again, in 
physical terms, the question is whether the "parameter of order" (Haken) 
or "attractor" (Prigogine) of this supersession will be the natural or the 
social sciences. Precisely, because we are living in a state of turbulence, 
the fluctuations of the new paradigm behave unequally in the various 
regions of the dominant paradigm, and so the signs of the future are 
ambiguous. Some interpret them as the emergence of a new naturalism 
revolving around the biological presuppositions of human behavior. This 
is the argument of Konrad Lorenz or of sociobiology. For them, the 
supersession of the dichotomy natural/social sciences is occurring under 
the aegis of the natural sciences. Against this view, it might be said that 
its conception of the future is the same conception with which the 
natural sciences have justified within the dominant paradigm their 
current scientific, social, and political prestige. It therefore sees in the 
future only that which will repeat the present. If, on the other hand, we 
consider more deeply the theoretical content of those sciences that are 
more advanced in their knowledge of matter, we shall realize that the 
emergent intelligibility of nature is infused with concepts, theories, 
metaphors, and analogies from the social sciences. We need only think 
of Prigogine's "dissipative structures" and Haken's "synergy." Both 
theories explain the behavior of particles by such concepts as social 
revolutions, violence, slavery, domination, nuclear democracy—all of 
which are borrowed from the social sciences (sociology, political 
science, history, etc.). The same applies to Capra's theories on the 
relation between physics and psychoanalysis, in which the patterns of 
matter and the patterns of mind are seen to reflect each other. Even 
though these theories blur the borderlines between the objects of physics 
and the objects of biology, the latter has no doubt absorbed the 
explanatory models 
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of the social sciences more deeply in recent decades. The concepts of 
teleomorphism, autopoiesis, self-organization, organized potentiality, 
originality, individuality, and historicity do indeed ascribe human 
behavior to nature. Thus, in a recent book on the life sciences, 
Lovelock (1979) states that our bodies are made up of cell cooperatives. 
That the explanatory models of the social sciences have been behind 
the development of the natural sciences for the past decades is further 
indicated by the fact that, once they have been formulated in their 
specific domain, the natural-physical sciences are easily applied to the 
social domain. Thus, for example, Peter Alien (1981), one of 
Prigogine's closest collaborators, has applied the theory of dissipative 
structures to economic processes and to the evolution of cities and 
regions. Haken (1985), in turn, has stressed the potentialities of 
synergetics to explain revolutionary situations in society. It is as if 
Durkheim's motto had been reversed. Rather than studying social 
phenomena as if they were natural phenomena, scientists now study 
natural phenomena as if they were social phenomena. 
The fact that the supersession of the dichotomy between natural and 
social sciences is being carried out under the aegis of the social 
sciences, however, is not enough to characterize the model of 
knowledge in the emergent paradigm. Since, as mentioned above, the 
social sciences themselves were formed in the nineteenth century 
according to the models of rationality of the classical natural sciences, 
to speak of the aegis of the social sciences may turn out to be 
misleading. I did say, however, that the social sciences were constituted 
according to two different tendencies: one of them closely linked to the 
positivist epistemology and methodology of the natural sciences; the 
other, of an anti-positivist vocation, molded in a complex philosophical 
tradition of phenomenology, interaction-ism, myth-symbolism, 
hermeneutics, existentialism, and pragmatism. The latter claim the 
particularity of the study of society, while at the same time assuming a 
mechanistic conception of nature. The power of the latter trend in the 
past decades indicates that it is a model of social sciences which, in a 
time of scientific revolution, carries within itself the post-modern sign of 
the emergent paradigm. It is indeed a transitional model, for it defines 
the specificity of the human in opposition to a conception of nature that 
the natural sciences today consider superseded; but it is a model less 
strongly attached to the 
past than to the future. In sum, to the degree that the natural sciences 
are getting closer to the social sciences, the social sciences are getting 
closer to the humanities. The subject, cast into the diaspora of irrational 
knowledge by modern science, is returning, charged with the task of 
rebuilding a new scientific order. 
That this is the global trend of our present scientific revolution is 
also suggested by the ongoing reconceptualization of the epistemological 
and methodological conditions of social scientific knowledge. I have 
enumerated above some of the obstacles to the scientificity of the social 
sciences, which, according to the still dominant paradigm, are 
supposedly responsible for the backwardness of the social sciences vis-
a-vis the natural sciences. But it is also the case, as I have already 
indicated, that new developments in the knowledge of the natural 
sciences, and the epistemological reflection that they have brought 
about, have shown that the obstacles to the scientific knowledge of 
society and culture are actually conditions of knowledge in general, be it 
of social or of natural objects. In other words, what used to be 
considered the explanation of the greater backwardness of the social 
sciences today is seen as the greater advance of the natural sciences. 
Hence, Thomas Kuhn's notion of the pre-paradigmatic (i.e., less 
developed) character of the social sciences (Kuhn, 1962), to which I 
myself previously subscribed furthermore (Santos, 1978: 29ff.), must 
be considerably revised, if not abandoned. 
The supersession of the natural sciences/social sciences dichotomy 
tends, therefore, to revalue the humanities. But for this revaluation to 
take place, the humanities need themselves to be profoundly changed. 
What there is in them of the future is that they have resisted the 
separation between subject and object, and that they have preferred to 
understand the world rather than to manipulate it. Their genuine core 
was, however, often trapped in mystifying preoccupations (dreamy 
esotericism and empty erudition). The ghetto into which the 
humanities chose to retire was in part a strategic defense against the 
assault of the social sciences that triumphantly wielded the scientistic 
bias. But it was also the result of the void they felt, once their space had 
been taken over by the scientistic model. That is what happened in 
historical studies with quantitative history, in legal studies with the pure 
theory of law and legal dogmatics, and in philological, literary, and 
linguistic studies with 
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structuralism. The genuine core of the humanities must be recovered 
and put to the service of a global reflection about the world. The text, 
which has always been the concern of philology, is one of the basic 
analogies upon which the knowledge about nature and society will be 
built in the emergent paradigm. 
The humanistic conception of the social sciences, as the catalyst of 
the gradual melting together of natural and social sciences, places the 
person, as author and subject of the world, at the very center of 
knowledge, but, unlike what happened in the traditional humanities, it 
places what we today call nature at the center of the person. There is 
no human nature because all nature is human. It is therefore necessary 
to look for global categories of intelligibility, hot concepts capable of 
melting down the frontiers into which modern science has divided and 
enclosed reality. Post-modern science is an admittedly analogical 
science that knows what it knows less well through what it knows 
better. I have already invoked the textual analogy. Other important 
basic categories of the emergent paradigms are, to my mind, the 
analogies of play, of drama, and even of biography. Today the world is 
natural or social, tomorrow it will be both, and will be looked at as if it 
were a text or a play, theater or an autobiography. Clifford Geertz spoke 
of these humanistic analogies (1983: 19ff.) but he restricted their use to 
the social sciences; I conceive of them as universal categories of 
intelligibility. 
It will not be long before particle physics shall speak of particles 
playing, or biology of the molecular theater, or astrophysics of the 
heavenly text, or chemistry of the biography of chemical reactions. 
Each of these analogies unveils a corner of the world. Total nakedness, 
which will always be the nakedness of those who see themselves in 
what they see, will arise out of the configurations of analogies we may be 
capable of imagining. After all, the play presupposes a stage, the stage 
requires a text, the text is its author's autobiography. Play, theater, text, 
or biography, the world is communication, and that is why the 
existential logic of post-modern science is to promote the 
"communicative situation" as conceived by Habermas. Streams of 
meanings and their constellations are converging into rivers, whose 
sources are in our local practices, which drag along with them the 
sands of our molecular, individual, communal, social, and planetary 
trajectories. This is not a jumble of meanings (which would be noise, 
not meaning), but rather interactions and 
intertextualities organized around local projects of undivided knowledge. 
From this arises the second characteristic of post-modern scientific 
knowledge. 
2. All knowledge is local and total. 
In modern science knowledge advances by specialization. Knowledge is 
ever more rigorous as its object is restricted. Indeed, herein lies what is 
today recognized as the basic dilemma of modern science: its rigor 
increases in direct proportion to the arbitrariness with which it 
straitjackets reality. As a disciplinary knowledge, it is prone to be a 
disciplined knowledge—that is to say, it organizes knowledge by 
policing the borders and repressing all trespassers. It is recognized today 
that the extreme fragmentation and disciplinarity of scientific knowledge 
turns the scientist into a specialized ignorant person—a negative 
development whose effects are visible primarily in the applied sciences. 
Technology today is concerned about its destructive impact on the 
ecosystems. Medicine is realizing that the hyperspecialization of medical 
knowledge has transformed the patient into a meaningless checkerboard 
of parts, when in fact we are only ever ill as a whole person. Pharmacy 
is discovering the destructive side of drugs, all the more destructive to 
the degree that they are more specific, and looks for a new logic of 
chemical combination heedful of organic equilibrium. Law, having 
reduced the complexity of legal life to the dryness of dogmatics, is 
rediscovering the philosophical and sociological world in its search for a 
lost prudence. Economics, after having legitimated quantitative and 
technocratic reductionism claiming thereby success in economic 
predictions, is being forced to recognize, given the poverty of the 
results, that the human and sociological quality of the economic agents 
and processes is now sneaking in through the window after having been 
forced out the door. In order to garner the recognition of its users (who, 
whether public or private, institutional or individual, have always been 
in a position of power vis-a-vis those being analyzed), applied 
psychology has favored efficient and manageable tools, such as tests, 
which have reduced personality's richness to the functional demands of 
unidimensional institutions. 
The evils of this fragmentation of knowledge and the arbitrary 
reductionism it carried with it are now being recognized, but the 
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measures offered to correct them usually end up doing nothing more 
than reproducing them in another guise. New disciplines are created to 
solve the problems brought about by the old, and thus the same model 
of scientificity is reproduced. To give one example, the general 
practitioner, resurrected in the hope of compensating for medical 
hyperspecialization, is running the risk of being transformed into 
simply one more specialist. This perverse effect suggests that there is 
no solution for this problem within the dominant paradigm, for the 
latter is precisely the problem, from which all the others arise. 
In the emergent paradigm, knowledge is total. Its horizon is 
Wigner's universal totality or Bohm's undivided totality. But it is as 
local as it is total. It is gathered around themes adopted by concrete 
social groups at a given time as projects of local life, be it to recover the 
history of a place, to preserve a green space, to build a computer 
adequate to the local needs, to make the infant mortality rate decrease, 
to invent a new musical instrument, to wipe out an illness, etc., etc. 
Post-modern fragmentation is thematic rather than disciplinary. Its 
themes are like galleries along which the various kinds of knowledge 
move, meeting each other. Unlike what happens in the present 
paradigm, knowledge advances as its object grows larger. Like a tree, it 
grows by differentiation and the spreading of its roots, in search of new 
and more varied interfaces. 
But though it is local, post-modern knowledge is also total, 
because it reconstitutes the local cognitive projects, stressing their 
exemplarity and thus turning them into enlightened local thinking. 
While claiming to be analogic, as I said earlier, the science of the 
emergent paradigm also claims to be a translator. That is to say, it 
encourages the emigration of concepts and theories developed locally 
to other cognitive spheres and their utilization outside their original 
context. Such a procedure, which was suppressed in the form of 
knowledge that conceived via operationalism and generalized via 
quantification and uniformity, is quite normal in the form of knowledge 
that conceives via the imagination and generalizes via quality and 
exemplarity. 
Though total, post-modern knowledge is not deterministic; though 
local, it is not descriptive. It is knowledge about the conditions of 
possibility. It is knowledge about the conditions of possibility of human 
action projected into the world from local time-spaces. 
Such knowledge is relatively unmethodical, since it springs from 
methodological plurality. Each method is a language, and reality replies 
in the language of the question. Only a constellation of methods can 
capture the silence between each language asking questions. In the 
phase of scientific revolution we are traversing, this plurality of 
methods is possible only through methodological transgression.11 If it is 
true that each method clarifies only that which is convenient for it, and 
when it does clarify anything, does not allow for any major surprises, 
scientific innovation consists in inventing persuasive contexts that allow 
the application of methods outside their natural habitat. Since the 
narrowing of the gap between the natural and the social sciences will 
bring the former nearer to the latter, we might wonder whether it is 
possible, for example, to do a philological analysis of an urban project, 
to interview a bird, or to perform participant observation among 
computers. 
Methodological transgression affects the literary styles and genres 
that govern scientific discourse. Post-modern science does not adopt a 
unidimensional, easily identifiable style; it uses a configuration of styles 
constructed according to the scientist's criteria and personal 
imagination. Discursive tolerance is the other side of methodological 
plurality. In this transition phase there are already clear signs of this 
process of stylistic fusion, of interpenetration of writing canons. Clifford 
Geertz (1983: 20) studied this phenomenon in the social sciences and 
presented a few examples: philosophical investigation that sounds like 
literary criticism in Sartre's work on Flaubert; baroque fantasies under 
the guise of empirical observations in jorge Luis Borges; parables 
presented as if they were ethnographic research in Carlos Castañeda; 
epistemological studies in the form of political texts, as in Paul 
Feyerabend's Against Method. And like Geertz, we might ask if Foucault 
is a historian, a philosopher, a sociologist, or a political scientist. The 
individualized, transdisciplinary composites indicated by these examples 
suggest a movement towards a greater personalization of scientific 
knowledge. And here we arrive at the third characteristic of scientific 
knowledge in the emergent paradigm. 
11
 On the concept of methodological transgression, see Santos (1981: 275ff.). 
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3. All knowledge is self-knowledge. 
Modern science consecrated man as epistemic subject but expelled 
him, as it had expelled God, as empirical subject. Rigorous, factual, 
objective knowledge could not permit the interference of human or 
religious values. This is the ground for the dichotomous distinction 
between subject and object. However, this distinction was never as 
acceptable in the social sciences as in the natural sciences, and as 
already stated, this was the supposed cause of the former's 
backwardness. After all, the objects of study were men and women, like 
those studying them. The epistemological distinction between subject 
and object had to be methodologically articulated with the empirical 
distance between subject and object. This is quite obvious if we compare 
the methodological strategies of cultural and social anthropology on the 
one hand, and of sociology on the other. In anthropology the empirical 
distance between subject and object was enormous. The subject was 
the "civilized" anthropologist; the object was the "primitive" (or 
"savage") people. In this case, it was acceptable, even necessary, that 
an object be narrowed down by means of methodologies calling for a 
greater intimacy with the object, namely ethnographic field work and 
participant observation. In sociology, on the other hand, the empirical 
distance between subject and object was small or even non-existent. 
European scientists did research on their fellow-citizens. In this case, 
the epistemological distinction required a widening of the distance by 
means of methodologies of detachment: for example, the sociological 
questionnaire, content analysis, and the structured interview. 
Anthropology, between postwar decolonization and the Vietnam war, 
and sociology, since the late 1960's, have come to question this 
methodological status quo, as well as the underlying notions of social 
detachment. All of a sudden, the savages were seen to be within us, 
within our societies, and sociology proceeded more often to utilize 
methods (like participant observation) which earlier had been almost 
the monopoly of anthropology. At the same time, in anthropology the 
objects had become peers, full-fledged members of the United Nations, 
and had to be studied according to sociological methods. The effect of 
these shifts in distinction between subject and object in the social 
sciences finally exploded in the poststructuralist period. 
In the field of the natural sciences, the return of the subject had 
already been announced by quantum mechanics when it demonstrated 
that the act of knowledge and the product of knowledge were 
inseparable. The developments in microphysics, astrophysics, and 
biology during the last decades have restored to nature the properties of 
which they had been deprived by modern science. The deepening of 
knowledge conducted according to a materialist matrix finally emerged 
as an idealistic knowledge. The new dignity of nature was further 
strengthened by the realization that disordered technological 
development had separated us from, rather than united us with, nature, 
and that the exploitation of nature entailed the exploitation of man. The 
uneasiness that the distinction between subject and object had always 
provoked in the social sciences thus spread to the natural sciences. The 
subject was coming back donning the object's garb. Furthermore, 
Bateson's concepts of the "immanent mind," the "wider mind," and the 
"collective mind," as well as many others, represented dispersed indica-
tions that that other fugitive of modern science, God, might be about to 
return. He will return transfigured, with nothing divine about him 
except our desire for harmony and communion with all that surrounds 
us and which is, we now see, our innermost self. A new gnosis is in the 
process of gestation. 
We can assert today, to paraphrase Clausewitz, that the object is the 
continuation of the subject by other means. Therefore, all scientific 
knowledge is self-knowledge. Science does not discover; rather it 
creates. And the creative acts performed by each scientist and by the 
scientific community as a whole must be understood intimately before 
we can use this knowledge to know reality. Metaphysical 
presuppositions, systems of belief, value judgments do not come before 
or after the scientific explanation of nature or society; they are part and 
parcel of it. Modern science is not the only possible explanation of 
reality; and there is no scientific reason whatsoever that it should even 
be considered better than the alternative explanations of metaphysics, 
astrology, religion, art, or poetry. The reason why we give priority today 
to a form of knowledge based on the prediction and control of 
phenomena has nothing to do with science. It is a value judgment. The 
scientific explanation of phenomena is the self-justification of science 




The consecration of modern science in the course of the past 400 
years has naturalized the explanation of reality, to the extent that we 
cannot conceive of the real except in ways that science offers us. 
Without such categories as space, time, matter, and number—the 
cardinal metaphors of modern physics according to Roger Jones 
(1982)—we are incapable of thinking, even if we are now capable of 
considering them conventional, arbitrary, metaphorical categories. The 
process of naturalization was slow. The protagonists of the scientific 
revolution had a clear sense that the innermost proof of their personal 
convictions preceded and gave coherence to the external proofs they 
developed. Descartes revealed better than anyone else die 
autobiographical character of science. He wrote in his Discourse on 
Method: "I shall be glad ... to reveal in this discourse what paths I have 
followed, and to present my life in it as in a picture, so that everyone 
may judge it for himself; and thus, learning from public response the 
opinions held of it, I shall add a new means of self-instruction to those I 
am accustomed to using" (Descartes, 1988: 21). Today we know, or 
suspect, that our personal trajectories and that of the collective 
scientific community, as well as the values, the beliefs, and prejudices 
they bring with them, are the innermost proof of our knowledge, without 
which our laboratory or archival research, our calculations or our field 
work would be no more than a tangle of meaningless efforts, from 
beginning to end. Nonetheless, such knowledge of our life trajectories 
and values, of which we may or may not be aware, flows in 
subterranean, clandestine ways, in the unspoken presumptions of our 
current scientific discourse. 
In the emergent paradigm, the autobiographical and self-referential 
character of science is fully acknowledged. Modern science has 
bequeathed us a functional knowledge of the world which has 
enlarged to an extraordinary degree our prospects of survival. Today, 
the question is not how to survive, but how to live. This requires 
another form of knowledge, holistic, intimate knowledge, that does 
not separate us from, but rather connects us personally with, whatever 
we study. The uncertainty of knowledge, which modern science has 
always viewed as a technical limitation to be gradually overcome, is 
transformed into the key to understanding of a world that must be 
contemplated rather than controlled. This has nothing to do with the 
medieval wonderment before a hostile 
reality haunted by the divine spirit. It is rather a sense of prudence 
before a world which, even though it be tamed, reveals to us each day 
the precarious meaning of our life, however stable it may be at the level 
of survival. The science of the emergent paradigm is contemplative 
rather than active. The quality of knowledge is assessed not only by 
what it controls or operates in the external world but by the personal 
satisfaction it brings to whoever enjoys and partakes of it. 
The esthetic dimension of science has been acknowledged by 
scientists and philosophers of science from Poincaré to Kuhn, from 
Polanyi to Popper. Roger Jones (1982: 41) thought that Newton's 
system was a work of art as much as a work of science. Scientific 
creation in the emergent paradigm is becoming ever nearer to literary 
or artistic creation. They share the belief that the active dimension of 
the transformation of reality (the sculptor chiseling the block of stone) 
should be subordinated to the contemplation of the result (the work of 
art). Scientific discourse, in its turn, is getting increasingly close to the 
discourse of literary criticism. In a way, literary criticism presages the 
subversion of the subject/object relation which the emergent paradigm 
seeks to effect. In literary criticism, the object of study, as we would 
call it in scientific language, has always been, in effect, a supersubject (a 
poet, a novelist, a dramatist) in relation to whom the critic was no more 
than a secondary subject or secondary author. It is true that, in recent 
times, the critic has been tempted to outdo the writer under scrutiny, to 
the point that we might even speak of a struggle for supremacy. But 
precisely because it is a struggle, it involves two subjects rather than a 
subject and an object. Each is the other's translation; both are creators 
of texts. Their texts are written in different languages, but both 
languages are necessary to learn how to appreciate the words and the 
world. 
Thus resubjectified, scientific knowledge teaches us how to live and 
becomes everyday know-how. Hence the fourth and last characteristic of 
post-modern science. 
4. All scientific knowledge aims at becoming common sense. 
I have argued that the foundation of the privileged status of scientific 
rationality is not in itself scientific. We know today that 
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modern science teaches us very little about our way of being in the 
world, and that the little that it teaches us will always be scanty, no 
matter how much we increase it, since its scantiness is inscribed in the 
very form of knowledge it constitutes. Modern science produces both 
knowledge and ignorance. If it turns the scientist into someone with 
specialized ignorance, it turns the ordinary citizen into someone with 
generalized ignorance. 
On the other hand, post-modern science knows that no single form 
of knowledge is in itself rational; only their collective configuration can 
be rational. Therefore it tries to enter into a dialogue with other forms 
of knowledge and permits itself to be influenced by them. The most 
important other form is common sense knowledge, the ordinary, 
practical knowledge that guides our everyday behavior and gives 
meaning to our life. Modern science built itself against common 
sense, which it deemed superficial, illusory, and false. Post-modern 
science tries to rehabilitate common sense, for it recognizes in this 
form of knowledge some capacity to enrich our relationship with the 
world. Common sense knowledge, it is true, tends to be a mystified 
and mystifying knowledge, but in spite of that, and in spite of its 
conservative quality, it does have a Utopian and liberating dimension 
that may be enhanced by its dialogue with scientific knowledge. This 
Utopian, liberating quality may be seen to flourish in many different 
characteristics of our common sense knowledge. 
Common sense collapses cause and intention. It rests on a 
worldview based on action and on the principle of individual creativity 
and responsibility. Common sense is practical and pragmatic. It 
reproduces knowledge drawn from the life trajectories and experiences 
of a given social group, and asserts that this link to group experience 
renders it reliable and reassuring. Common sense is self-evident and 
transparent. It mistrusts the opacity of technological objectives and the 
esoteric nature of knowledge, arguing the principle of equal access to 
discourse, to cognitive and linguistic competence. Common sense is 
superficial, because it disdains structures that cannot be consciously 
apprehended, but for the same reason it is expert at capturing the 
horizontal complexity of conscious relations both among people and 
between people and things. Common sense knowledge is non-
disciplinary and non-methodical. It is ! not the product of a practice 
expressly devised to create it; it repro- 
duces itself spontaneously in the daily happenings of life. Common 
sense accepts what exists as is. It favors actions that do not provoke 
significant ruptures in reality. Finally, common sense is rhetorical and 
metaphorical; it does not teach, it persuades. 
In the light of what was said about the emerging paradigm, these 
characteristics of common sense have the merit of anticipating it. Left 
to itself, common sense is conservative and may well legitimate claims 
to superior knowledge. However, once articulated with scientific 
knowledge, it may be the source of a new rationality —a rationality 
comprised of multiple rationalities. For this configuration of knowledge 
to occur, it is necessary to invert the epistemological break. In modern 
science the epistemological break symbolizes the qualitative leap from 
common sense knowledge to scientific knowledge; in post-modern 
science the most important leap is that from scientific knowledge to 
common sense knowledge. Post-modern scientific knowledge fulfills 
itself only insofar as it becomes translated into common sense. Only 
thus will it be a clear science that fulfills Wittgenstein's dictum: 
"Everything that can be said, can be said clearly" (Wittgenstein, 1981: 
4.116). Only thus will it be a transparent science that does justice to 
Nietzsche's desire that "all commerce among men aims at letting each 
one read upon the other's soul, common language being the sound 
expression of that common soul" (Nietzsche, 1971: 139). 
By becoming common sense, post-modern science does not shun 
the knowledge that produces technology, but does believe that, as 
knowledge must translate into self-knowledge, so technological 
development must translate into life wisdom. The latter points out the 
markers of prudence for our scientific adventure, prudence being the 
acknowledgment and control of insecurity. Just as Descartes, at the 
threshold of modern science, knew doubt rather than suffered it, we 
too, at the threshold of post-modern science, should know insecurity 
rather than suffer it. 
In this phase of scientific transition and revolution, such insecurity 
derives from the fact that our epistemological reflection is far more 
advanced and sophisticated than our scientific practice. None of us 
could at this moment visualize concrete research projects that might 
fully correspond to the emergent paradigm I have sketched here. That 
is precisely because we are in a period of transition. We have sufficient 
doubts about the past to imagine the future, but we 
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live too much in the present to accomplish the future in it. We are 
divided and fragmented. We know we are on the path, but not how far 
along in the journey we are. The epistemological condition of science 
is visible in the existential condition of the scientists. In the end, if all 
knowledge is self-knowledge, then all ignorance is self-ignorance. 
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